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Shifts in Foreign Trade, Competitiveness and Growth Potential:
From Baltics to “Bal-techs”?
1 Introduction
Exports are an important source of economic growth. Below we will show that countries
with above average competitiveness in a given sector have a growing export share in the world
market for this sector. There are several sources of competitiveness. First of all, technological
progress is considered to be an important source of competitiveness: it either raises productivity
(price competitiveness) or increases product quality. For our present purpose, we will concentrate
on the impact of technological progress on productivity. Second, (low) wages can be a source of
competitiveness. And finally, a country’s competitiveness can be improved by exchange rate
devaluations. 
In this paper, we will first try to assess the competitiveness of exports from the Baltic
States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. That is, we will evaluate in what sectors the Baltics
have improved their export position. Moreover, we will assess what factors account for improved
export performance. We find competitiveness of the Baltics in sectors with little technology-
intensity. We argue that the reason is the inferiority of production technology in the Baltics in
comparison with the technology frontier. We find that, as yet, there is little indication that
production technology is improving relative to the frontier, so the increases in labour
productivity, which we find to account for the improved export performance, cannot be attributed
to technological progress. This brings us to the second issue in this paper: one may wonder
whether the Baltics have the potential to catch up with the technology frontier in the future. The
prerequisites for catching up are (i) a well developed stock of human capital and (ii) an
organisation of this stock of human capital that promotes the diffusion of technology throughout
the economy. The Baltics fulfil the first requirement, but when it comes to the organisation of
human capital, and in particular the organisation of R&D personnel, the prospects are less
promising. This implies that developing competitiveness in technology-intensive sectors might
take longer than generally assumed in studies that look only at the stock of human capital. The
paper is organised as follows.
First, we will formally establish that there are three sources of competitiveness:
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 The following argument is taken from Verspagen (1992). 1
productivity differentials, wage differentials and exchange rates. This is done in section 2. Then,
in section 3, we analyse changes in exports from the Baltic States. The analysis is split up in two
parts: if one wants to evaluate the evolution of export shares of formerly centrally planned
economies, one cannot omit an analysis of the Counsil for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), since it has heavily influenced contemporary trade patterns in these economies. So, first
we look at trade patterns until 1991. The CMEA was dissolved in January 1991, after which
substantial liberalisation and stabilisation measures have been taken. The second part of the
analysis of changes in exports involves changes from 1992 onward. In section 4, we will try to
assess which of the abovementioned factors (productivity differentials, wage differentials, and
exchange rate devaluations) can account for recent increases in export shares of the Baltic States
in international markets. Section 5 deals with the analysis of catching up, and the role of human
capital in this process. We end this part of the paper by a few concluding remarks in section 6.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Productivity, wages and export growth
 Differences in growth rates between countries are very much dependent on differences
in trade patterns across countries.  Assume that for every sector in a country there is but one1
market, the world market. The growth rate of production in sector i in country j is then
determined by the country's growth rate of its market share (X ) in sector i and the growth rateij
of the total world market for sector i, i.e.,
(1)
where Q  = (Q . i j ij*
In order to obtain the growth rates of aggregate production in country j and the aggregate
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world market, take the summation over sectors, using sector shares as weights. Then, the growth
rate differential between country j and the 'world' can be expressed as,
(2)
where )s denote sector shares.
The first term on the right-hand side expresses that a country with above average
competitiveness grows faster than others as a result of increasing export shares. The extent to
which export performance feeds through on economic growth is dependent on the share of the
exporting sector in total domestic production () ). The second term on the right-hand sideij
expresses that growth differences between countries are also dependent on the extent of relative
specialisation. The growth differential between country j and the rest of the world is reinforced
if the country is relatively specialised in a sector with a high growth potential. In the extreme case
that there are no differences in competitiveness, growth differentials are solely determined by
relative specialisation patterns. 
In the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, relative specialisation patterns are
explained by factor composition. It is assumed that all countries use the same technology in
production, and only differ in terms of relative factor supplies. A country that has a relative
abundance of, say, unskilled labour is said to have a comparative advantage in those products that
use this factor intensively. As a result, it will be relatively specialised in the production and
export of labour-intensive products. 
However, we choose to omit an analysis of relative specialisation for the following
reason. The assumption of equality in production technology between the Baltic States on the one
hand, and, e.g., the US and OECD Europe on the other, is somewhat hard to maintain in practice:
production technologies used in OECD Europe and the US are generally more advanced. In other
words, there are technology gaps between the Baltic States on the one hand, and the US and
OECD Europe on the other. Below we will show that technology gaps lead to differences in
competitiveness. Productivity differentials and wage differentials are shown to be the main
sources of competitiveness, and consequently of changes in export shares.
Assume two countries, a leader country l and a follower country f. The rate of
technological progress in the leader country is higher than in a laggard. We define technological
Cij
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 the equation is taken from Landesmann and Stehrer (1996) .2
 Let small-case letters denote rate of change.3
progress as the improvement of production technologies. By this definition, production
technology in the leader country is superior to production technology in the laggard. Letting %il
and %  denote the growth rate of labour productivity in sector i in the leading country and theif
following country, respectively, it follows that  the rate of productivity growth is highest in the
leader country. How does this affect trade? We assume that countries are engaged in a process
of competition for sectoral market shares based on their respective prices. Prices are determined
by unit costs C   plus a given mark-up, orij
P  = (1+M )C j=l,f   (3)ij ij ij
Define unit costs in sector i  as :2
j=l,f   (4)
where ( P a  denote the unit cost of intermediate input and  a  = L /Q , is the labour coefficientxj xj xj ij ij ij
(with L  denoting employment in sector i in country j and Q  denoting output in sector i inij ij
country j).
Through equation (4) we can see that there is a trade-off between productivity, which
enhances competitiveness, and wages, which diminish competitiveness. The superiority of
country l's technology over country f in sector i entails an absolute advantage, % /% . At the sameil if
time, country l faces an absolute disadvantage vis-à-vis country f in terms of its wages. This
follows from the relation between wages and productivity. 
Wages are supposed to track labour productivity as long as the labour market is close to
full employment. However, the link between wages and productivity may be distorted by labour
market imbalances. In this last assumption we follow Goodwin (1967), who assumes that varying
rates of unemployment govern changes in the wage rate. Let us write wage rate dynamics in
sector i as3
wij
%ij	hjUj
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 See footnote no. 2.4
 The latter equation expresses that there is a relation between wages in one sector and the overall situation5
in a country's labour market. This is to say that institutional factors play a role in labour markets. 
j=l,f   (5)
where U  is the unemployment rate in a country f, or l. It is defined as :j 4
j=l,f   (6)
where a  = L /Q  is the labour coefficient (with L  denoting employment in sector i in countryij ij ij ij
j and Q  denoting output in sector i in country j), and N is the working population.  ij 5
From equation (5) we can immediately see the impact of technological progress on wages.
The increase in the growth rate of labour productivity in sector i has a direct positive impact on
the growth of wages in that sector. This effect is somewhat dampened however by an increase
in the unemployment rate, as technological progress reduces the labour input requirements. If the
degree of technological asymmetry is high, the technology gap may exceed the wage differential.
In this case, country l's absolute disadvantage in terms of wages is more than compensated by its
superior technology and, correspondingly, higher productivity. We can express this by the
following inequality:
(7)
The role of the wage differential is an important one in this respect, since it determines
the borderline between countries' sectoral competitiveness and reversal thereof. If the wage
differential had dominated over the asymmetries in technology, the less advanced country f would
Xij
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be more competitive than the advanced country l, notwithstanding the latter's superior
technology. If the impact of institutional factors on the labour market is large in the sense that
they distort the link between sectoral wages and sectoral productivity, the importance of wages
is likely to increase. Let E  denote sectoral competitiveness, then we can writeij
E  = f(% ,w ,% ,w ), j=l,f   (8)ij il il if if
In other words, a country’s competitiveness is determined by productivity differentials
and wage differentials.
A country's competitiveness is linked to its trade performance by some mechanism of
selection which is (implicitly) embodied in the diversity between countries. Competitiveness can
be ranked by the superiority (inferiority) of technologies: countries whose competitiveness
exceeds that of others, will be 'rewarded' by a rising world-market share, and vice versa. The
selection mechanism which links a country's sectoral competitiveness to its export performance
can be represented by the following replicator equation:
(9)
where X  is the export share of country j in the world market for sector I, a dot indicates growth,ij
and a bar indicates an average level. E  is given by equation (8). The standard for selection isij
here defined as the average level of international competitiveness,
(10)
It can be seen that countries whose sectoral competitiveness is above (below) average, have a
growing (declining) share in the sector's world market. 
P
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2.2. Exchange rates and export growth
In addition to productivity differentials and wage differentials, currency devaluations can
also be considered an important source of competitiveness. We assumed that countries are
engaged in a process of competition for market shares based on their respective prices. A
country’s prices in foreign currency is directly influenced by the exchange rate of the domestic
currency e ,wj
(11)
where P  is an equivalent of equation (3).ij
It can easily be seen that a depreciation (or a devaluation) lowers the exchange rate e ,wj
and prices in foreign currency accordingly. The country’s competitiveness in world markets in
increased as a result. Therefore, we can also write,
(12)
We can then repeat the last part of section 2.1 in which competitiveness is linked to trade
performance by the replicator equation (9).
 It should be noted that the description of the CMEA below applied in full extent to the USSR only. The6
countries in Central Europe (notably Poland and Hungary) undertook reforms in the 1980s in order to decentralise
foreign trade (Kaminski, Wang and Winters (1996)). So, the distortions in the latter countries’ trade are likely to be
somewhat smaller (but still substantial) than in the successor states of the former USSR.
 The CMEA members were the USSR, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia,7
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam. Yugoslavia was an associate member.
 The USSR supplied mostly fuels and minerals to Eastern European countries, and the Eastern European8
exports to the CMEA members consisted to a large extent of machinery.  
 Prices reflected the importance attributed to products by governments rather than relative scarcity.9
 Within the CMEA, all bilateral accounts were cleared by the International Bank for Economic10
Co-operation (Schrenk (1992)) and ex post  'payments' were made to each country in transferable rubles. These
transferable rubles lacked most properties of money (means of payment, store of value and, most importantly,
measure of value), it was merely a unit of account. As a result, a surplus could not be used to purchase additional
imports from a defecting trade partner. Nor was there a future obligation to supply on the part of a deficit country
(Hillman and Schnytzer (1992)). There may have been a downward bias on the volume of trade, as countries tried
3. The evolution of trade patterns
3.1. The CMEA
Contemporary trade patterns in all Central and Eastern European countries and the
successor states of the former Soviet Union have been influenced heavily by their past. So,  if one
attempts to make a proper assessment of the changes in former Socialist countries' trade with
Western Europe since 1989, one has to pay explicit attention to the role of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA).     6
Established in  1949, the CMEA was intended to serve "the purpose of co-operation to
achieve the objective of balanced industrialisation" [Hillman and Schnytzer (1992), p. 521]
across its members.  In other words, the benefits of 'international' division of labour were also7
recognised in socialist economies. Patterns of specialisation were negotiated bilaterally.  Trade8
was based on physical volumes, rather than on values. External relative prices used in CMEA
trade were negotiated ex ante to ensure that trade would be balanced bilaterally, and were
therefore devoid of any proper signalling function.  Moreover, external relative prices did not9
feed through upon prices for domestic producers. In each CMEA country the right to conduct
actual trade, once negotiations had been concluded, was given exclusively to a small number of
Foreign Trade Organisations (FTOs) for respective ranges of products. As such, FTOs were the
sole intermediary between domestic firms and international markets (both CMEA and
non-CMEA). Trade flows were denominated in transferable rubles.  However, FTOs and10
to prevent running surpluses, since this meant they were implicitly subsidising a deficit country (Schrenk (1992)).
 See Schrenk (1992) for details on what is called the principle of price of equalisation.11
 Heavy industry was assigned the highest priority since this sector would produce the machinery necessary12
to achieve industrialisation.The overriding policy objective of the Bolsjevik revolution in 1917 in Russia was to drag
the economy out of backwardness and accomplish modernisation by constructing a socialist state. Ever since then,
Soviet type of socialist development has emphasised industrialisation.
domestic enterprises dealt with each other in domestic currency exclusively. The result is that
domestic enterprises were completely isolated from international prices. Moreover, prices for
traded goods in domestic currency were highly distorted as they were set so as to ensure balanced
trade in domestic currency.  So, international prices played only a very limited role - to say the11
least - in conveying information to enterprises in the CMEA arrangement. Consequently, patterns
of specialisation within the CMEA framework did not reflect comparative advantage or relative
prices.            
Another significant feature of the CMEA arrangement is its creation of a duality in trade
within the CMEA on the one hand, and trade with market economies on the other. Supply in
socialist economies was determined by the central plan. The inputs deemed necessary to fulfil
the output targets were allocated to the various industries via a system of administrative planning.
Prices for producers were fixed by the government and they  reflected government priorities in
the sense that inputs for some industries were heavily subsidised.  Consumer prices were not12
entirely fixed. However, demand was regulated through the use of taxes and subsidies. For
example, prices of cars and electric appliances were heavily taxed so as to discourage demand
(Lavigne 1995). By applying different pricing rules for the production sector on the one hand and
the consumer on the other, producer and consumer markets were effectively separated. The
socialist economy was a supply-restricted economy: whatever was supplied was determined by
the central plan, eliminating every kind of consumer sovereignty. So, consumer preferences were
effectively eliminated. The result of this was that producers did not have to worry about quality
and product variety, not to mention innovation. 'More of the same' became the motto.  
This motto dictated trade throughout the CMEA framework: the products that were traded
were generally of low quality and the extent of product and process innovation was low. This
distinguished trade within the CMEA framework from trade on Western markets where
competitiveness in price or quality were the rules played by. Products traded within the CMEA
are referred to as 'soft', as opposed to 'hard' products which are sold against hard currency on
Western markets. The softness of products traded within the CMEA made such products highly
 Exceptions are products which are fairly standard such as fuels and minerals.13
 Within the CMEA framework, over 90 per cent of total exports and approximately 80 per cent of total14
imports (own calculations based on Watson’s (1994) data) in the Baltics were within the USSR. Therefore, we take
interrepublic trade to be the Baltic equivalent of CMEA trade.
 Note that even official exchange rates are highly distorted because they were determined through15
administrative planning rather than by market forces. That is why the world market value of trade is an
approximation.
context-specific, in the sense that these products could not be (easily) redirected to world
markets.  This created a duality in trade, with low-quality trade within the CMEA on the one13
hand, and trade conforming to international quality standards on world markets on the other.
In summary, the CMEA has had a major impact on trade patterns in Central and Eastern
Europe and the USSR by (i) centralising trade and isolating enterprises from world market prices,
thereby preventing trade from being determined by comparative advantage or relative prices, and
(ii) creating a duality in trade, with commodities traded within the CMEA largely unmarketable
in Western markets because of their low quality. 
The extent to which these features apply to the Baltic States can be illustrated by referring
to data on trade in 1990 in the former USSR in Watson (1994).  The results are shown in Tables14
1 and 2. Table 1 displays the value of trade in domestic prices and an approximation of its world
market value. The world market value of extrarepublic trade in hard currency is calculated as
follows: per sector, the hard currency value is converted into so-called 'foreign trade rubles' by
using a sector-specific, official exchange rate.  By adding up the sectoral values, one can derive15
the world market value of total trade. Notwithstanding its obvious shortcomings in reflecting true
world market value, this exercise does illustrates our point: there are differences between
international prices and domestic prices. In other words, domestic enterprises are cut off from
the former's influence.
The Baltics' commodity pattern of interrepublic and foreign trade is shown in Tables 1
and 2, respectively. Machinery, light industry products, food products and, to a lesser extent,
chemicals were the main categories of trade in all three countries in 1990. In all three countries,
there were large deficits in total trade in machinery. The fact that these deficits were dominated
by large deficits in interrepublic trade, implies that imported technology was mainly of low
quality and outdated. In the light industry, all countries ran surpluses in interrepublic trade and
deficits in extrarepublic trade. In other words, the surpluses in light industry trade were generated
in soft markets, whereas trade on hard markets yielded deficits. The surpluses in soft markets
dominated so that overall trade in light industry was in surplus. This implies that the 'competitive
 Under a currency board arrangement, base money must be fully backed by foreign exchange reserves.16
A central bank “is bound by a money creation rule that limits growth in base money to growth in foreign exchange
reserves. The extension of central bank credit to commercial banks is limited to the amount of foreign reserves in
excess of those needed to provide full backing to the base money issue.” [IMF (1994a), p. 20] 
strength' in the light industry was in low-quality products. The fact that exports in the main
export categories (e.g. machinery, light industry and chemicals) were almost totally dependent
on interrepublic markets (over 90 per cent of total exports in these categories was interrepublic)
implies that Baltic exports were generally of low quality and capital intensive, and practically
unmarketable in world markets. 
When the CMEA collapsed in January 1991, followed by the disintegration of the USSR
two months later, enterprises throughout the CMEA were suddenly exposed to world market
prices, which in most cases meant coping with deteriorating terms of trade as prices of fuels rose
and prices of machinery dropped, and were faced with the challenge of having to redirect their
exports to the West. The next section analyses how the Baltic States have adjusted their trade
patterns in the aftermath of the abovementioned events.
3.2. Changes in exports after trade liberalisation
As of 1992-93 (CEECs and the Baltics, respectively), macroeconomic stabilisation
policies and foreign trade liberalisation implemented at the beginning of the transition process
have taken effect. Strict monetary and interest rate policies have been implemented to bring down
inflation rates, which soared after price liberalisation in 1991-92. Estonia and Lithuania adopted
a currency board  to provide an anchor for prices. Moreover, extensive currency reforms have16
been undertaken, with the introduction of national currencies in all three countries in the course
of 1992-94. The Baltic States have virtually eliminated all export controls and state trading
(Kaminski, Wang and Winters (1996)), so that firms can engage in foreign trade themselves and
are exposed to foreign competition. Moreover, as a result of currency convertibility domestic
producers are no longer isolated from international price signals. 
Let us analyse how trade patterns in the Baltic States changed during and after these
reforms. We will focus on trade with the European Union (EU) as the emerging major trade
partner, as opposed to the formerly centrally planned economies, mainly the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Ideally we would have liked to use export shares of the Baltics in the
EU market as a measure of competitiveness, but as the statistical yearbooks of Estonia, Latvia
 From these figures it is difficult to draw conclusions about total trade volumes. The IMF (1994a)17
estimated output recovery and increased trade volumes from mid-1993.
and Lithuania do not classify trade in SITC, this has not been possible. Therefore, we use exports
from the Baltic States to the EU as an indicator of competitiveness (with the exception of Latvia
for which total exports are used), and compare export performance to imports. The results are
shown in Tables 3-5.
Trade between Estonia and the EU has increased across the board from very low base
levels in 1992. Both with respect to imports and exports the EU has become the main trading
partner as of 1995. This trade has not replaced trade with the CIS, though: with the exception of
exports of ‘footwear, headgear, umbrellas, ...’ and imports of ‘miscellaneous manufactured
articles’, trade with the CIS on the one hand, and with the EU on the other hand has increased
over 1992-95 (Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 1996). The recovery of real output during 1993,
after a cumulative decline of 30 per cent in 1991-93 (IMF (1994b)), accounts to a large extent
for this increase. The fastest growing export categories are (in declining order) ‘wood & articles
of wood’, ‘mechanical & electrical machinery’, ‘optical instruments & apparatus’, ‘footwear,
headgear, umbrellas, and ‘textile & textile articles’. However, only in ‘wood & articles of wood’
Estonia has an export surplus in trade with the EU. Notwithstanding a growth rate of 8,377 per
cent over 1992-95 in ‘mechanical & electrical machinery’ exports, there’s a substantial trade
deficit in this category.
In Lithuania there appears to be trade reorientation of trade from the CIS to the EU in
some categories, although the fact that figures for 1995 only cover January-September
(Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 1995-96).  In17
‘footwear, headgear, umbrellas, ...’, ‘mechanical & electrical machinery’, ‘optical instruments
& apparatus, ...’ and ‘miscellaneous manufactured articles’ CIS is still the main export
destination, but the volumes are decreasing whereas exports to the EU in these categories have
increased in the period 1994-95(until September). However, imports from the EU in these four
categories exceed exports by far. Export surpluses in trade with the EU are obtained in ‘wood &
articles of wood’, ‘textiles & textile articles’, and ‘base metals & articles of base metal’.
Exports in Latvia decline between 1993 and 1995 in such categories as ‘footwear,
headgear, umbrellas, ...’, ‘transport vehicles’ and ‘optical instruments & apparatus’, but increase
otherwise. Total exports increase in 1993-95. The strongest export growth rates are found in
‘wood & articles of wood’, ‘plastics & articles thereof; rubber’, and ‘pulp of wood; paper &
paperboard’, but the last two categories start from low initial volumes. Main export categories,
i.e. categories with export surpluses, are ‘raw hides, leather, furskin & articles’, ‘wood & articles
of wood’, ‘textiles & textile articles’, and ‘base metals & articles of base metal’.
It appears from these tables that the Baltics are competitive in such categories as ‘wood
& articles of wood’, ‘textiles & textile articles’ and ‘base metals & articles of base metal’. These
seem to be the type of products that require little adjustment when redirected from soft markets
to hard markets. This pattern was to be expected to ensue after the break-up of the CMEA.
4. Sources of Competitiveness
4.1. Productivity and Wage Differentials
What role do productivity and wage differentials play in the growth of exports? Data only
go as far as 1992, the year in which most stabilisation and liberalisation policies have been
implemented. As it takes time for the effects of these policies to come about, no firm conclusions
with respect to the medium and long run can be drawn. The data are reported in Table 6. We have
been able to find data for Latvia only. From the table it can be seen that both wages and labour
productivity increase in 1990-91, and even more so between 1991 and 1992. This implies that
competitiveness in terms of wages in Latvia is being eroded. The wage increase between 1990
and 1991 is lower than the increase in labour productivity in the same period, but in 1992 wage
growth accelerates and in 7 out of 12 categories wage increases exceed productivity growth.
Exceptions are ‘wood & articles of wood’, ‘pulp of wood; paper & paperboard’, ‘articles of
stone, plaster, cement, ...’, ‘base metals & articles of base metal’ and ‘transport vehicles’. In these
categories growth of productivity also exceeds wage growth from 1990 to 1992. It will hardly be
surprising to find that productivity growth between 1990 and 1992 has been highest in these
categories (growth rates of 2,322 per cent, 1,853 per cent, 2,198 per cent, 2,438 per cent, and
2,843 per cent, respectively). The high growth of labour productivity in ‘wood & articles of
wood’, and ‘base metals & articles of base metal’ corresponds with good export performance
(Table 5). Ideally, we would have liked to compare growth rates of wages and labour productivity
 The exercise of calculating growth rates of labour productivity and wages for the EU is currently being18
carried out. 
in Latvia with corresponding growth rates in the EU.  Nevertheless, the abovementioned18
increases in labour productivity should give a fair explanation of  the increases in exports (shares)
mentioned above. In other words, productivity growth is a source of competitiveness in ‘wood
& articles of wood’, and ‘base metals & articles of base metal’. 
Increases in productivity growth appear due to improved resource allocation in the short
run, rather than improvements in the level of technology (dealt with in section 2.1). The level of
technology in the Baltics is still far below the level in industrialised market economies. The size
of the technology gap can be gauged from an analysis of ‘unit values’. The unit values of exports
and imports are calculated by dividing the respective dollar values by the corresponding physical
weights. The UN Economic Commission for Europe describes how, by comparing the unit values
of exports and imports in the same categories, one can assess the difference in technology: “[a]
higher export “unit value” than that of imports for a given category may either reflect a quality
advantage of exported goods over imported ones, which in turn may arise from more advanced
production technology or higher skills, or it can be the result of the exported goods being
technologically different from the imported ones, (...).” [UNECE (1990), p. 48] The exercise of
calculating unit values has been carried out. Again due to data limitations, we have only been
able to do so for Latvia. The results in Table 7 show unit value ratios, i.e. unit values of exports
divided by the corresponding unit values of imports. A ratio of more (less) than one, indicates
that the technology content of exports is higher (lower) than that of imports.
It can easily be seen that the level of technology in Latvia is below that of its trading
partners (the majority of which are OECD-Europe countries) in most categories. Exceptions are
‘products of chemical & allied industries’, ‘plastics & articles thereof; rubber’, ‘raw hides,
leather, furskin & articles’, and ‘articles of stone, plaster, cement, ...’. But in case of ‘products
of chemical & allied industries’ the unit value ratio is decreasing over the period 1993-1996.I.
There is no sign of increasing unit value ratios in ‘wood & articles of wood’, and ‘base metals
& articles of base metal’, so the growth in labour productivity cannot be explained by catching
up in terms of the level of technology. The analysis of unit values also explains why growth of
labour productivity of 2,843 per cent in ‘transport vehicles’ has no (visible) effect on exports: the
level of production technology is too low to produce high-quality transport vehicles that are
 The 1992 and 1993 exchange rates have been calculated by converting the exhange rate of Latvian rubles19
(source IMF (1994c)) into lats by using the conversion rate of 200:1 Latvian ruble-to-lats. 
competitive in international markets. 
The issue of technological disadvantage in the Baltics is particularly critical in high-tech
sectors: these are the sectors in which technological progress is the main source of
competitiveness (through rapid productivity gains), but at the same time these are the sectors in
which the Baltics lag behind the most. Innovation and quality were given low priority under
socialism. Raising the level of technology is dependent on the Baltics’ ability to catch up in terms
of the level of technology. We will turn to the analysis of the catching up potential later. First,
let us analyse the role of exchange rates in export growth.
4.2. Exchange Rates
In section 3.2 we mentioned the fact that all three Baltic countries undertook radical
currency reforms, consisting of the introduction of national currencies. In June 1992, Estonia
introduced the kroon under a currency board arrangement. Rubles were converted into kroons
at a rate of 10:1 ruble-to-kroon, and the kroon was fixed at EEK 8/DM. In dollars, the kroon was
introduced at EEK 11.8/$. The rate for the year 1992 was EEK 11.7/$. The kroon depreciated in
1993 (EEK 13.2/$) and 1994 (EEK 14.6/$), but strengthened again in 1995 (EEK 13.7/$) and
1996 (EEK 11.9/$).
Latvia introduced the Latvian ruble as the only obligatory means of payment in July,
1992. The Latvian ruble was replaced by a new national currency, the lats, in October 1993.
Latvian rubles were converted into lats at a 200:1 Latvian rubles-to-lats rate. The exchange rate
of the lats in 1992 was lats 0.72/$ and remained constant over 1993.  It depreciated to about lats19
0.57/$ in 1994, and further down to lats 0.51/$ in 1995, at which time the depreciation bottomed
out and the exchange rate started to appreciate (lats 0.54/$ in 1996 and lats 0.6/$ in the first
quarter of 1997).
In Lithuania, the Russian ruble was replaced as legal tender by the talonas in October
1992. In June 1993, the litas was introduced at a 100:1 talonas-to-litas conversion rate. In April
1994, Lithuania adopted a currency board and the litas was fixed at Llt 4/$, reflecting a 2.5 per
cent depreciation from the level prevailing in the weeks prior to the introduction of the currency
board arrangement (IMF (1994a)). For the exchange rate developments in 1993 we quote the
IMF: “(...) The exchange rate of the domestic currency, after some depreciation in the early part
of the year, strengthened considerably, to Llt 3.9/$ by 1993, almost the same as at the end of
1992.” [IMF (1994a), p. 1]
In all three countries, the exchange strengthens again after some intial depreciation. Are
these exhange rate movements reflected in trade figures? Given the short period for which data
have been available, it’s difficult to draw robust conclusions. We cannot study changes in exports
after appreciation has started. In Estonia the kroon depreciates between 1992-94. The largest
increase in total exports to the EU is to be found in 1995, in other words immediately ensuing
the depreciation. In Latvia, depreciation occured in 1993-95. In the same period, exports grew
at 18.9 per cent and 30.48 per cent, respectively. We can say very little about the role of the
exchange rate in Lithuania: we only have data on trade for 1994-95, a period in which the litas
has remained fixed at Lls 4/$. Based on the (admittedly, limited) data, the above seems to
indicate that growing exports coincide with depreciation. This conclusion exacts caution,
however.
Judging the evidence of sources of competitiveness mentioned above, we can say that the
case is strongest for increases in labour productivity. Growth in labour productivity seems to
provide a good explanation for the strong export performance in ‘wood and articles of wood’ and
‘base metals & articles of base metals’ in Latvia. Strong growth in wages (in some cases
exceeding growth in labour productivity) reduces the advantage that the Baltic countries have
over the EU. Little can be said about the role of exchange rates due to the limited availability of
data.
The increase in labour productivity is due mainly to improved resource allocation, rather
than technological progress. The level of technology in the Baltics is still below that of the
technological frontier. As mentioned earlier, this is of biggest consequence in the high-tech
sectors. Is there any potential in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to catch up with the frontier and
perhaps even close the technology gap and thus become competitive in these high-tech sectors?
We will deal with this question in the next section.
5 Catching Up and Future Competitiveness 
5.1 Prerequisites for Catching Up
Technological progress is generated by creating and diffusing new knowledge or new
combinations of existing knowledge. One of the characteristics attributed to knowledge in theory
(see e.g. Romer (1990)), is that it is a non-rival good. In other words, once knowledge has been
produced it can be reproduced at little or no additional cost. This implies that countries that lag
behind technological leaders can capitalise on knowledge developed at the technological frontier.
As a result, they are able to catch up with the leader countries relatively easy.
However, we argue that catching up is more complex. A lagging country may not be able
to absorb kowledge if it does not have sufficient capacity to absorb knowledge spill-overs. Below
we will argue that a lagging country needs sufficient human capital in order to catch up with the
technological frontier. But more importantly, it needs to organise this human capital so as to
promote communication of knowledge. 
Absorbing knowledge from the technological frontier, first of all requires qualified
researchers who are able to interpret information about, and understand, the new technology and
recognise its value in operation. In other words, a lagging country needs a strong human capital
base with the emphasis on scientific, engineering and technical skills. 
Secondly, a lagging country needs to organise the co-ordination and exchange of this new
knowledge between different organisations and groups of organisations throughout the economy,
which requires well developed managerial skills. Technological progress involves different types
of organisations such as universities, research institutes and firms. Each type of organisation
generates knowledge that is to a large extent specific to the organisation. As a result, knowledge
diffusion between these types of organisations is restricted. On the one hand, knowledge spill-
overs absorbed by universities or research institutes cannot be implemented in productive
processes instantaneously; on the other hand, innovations in production techniques as a result of
technology transfer, or the need for new technology because of changing consumer demands,
may not find scientific back-up. It means that successful diffusion of knowledge spill-overs
requires the mobilisation, co-ordination, and integration, of many different types of knowledge.
A wide diversity of types of knowledge increases the costs and risks of acquiring
information. Therefore, Lundvall and Johnson (1994) argue, markets are no longer characterised
by anonymous relationships between separate users and producers based on perfect knowledge.
 Data (UNESCO (1996)) indicate that enrollment rates in secundary education in the Baltics are20
comparable with Western countries, and that enrollment in tertiary education is slightly below Western countries.
Communication, and in many cases even interaction, between knowledge producing
organisations, and between organisations that produce new knowledge and organisations that use
new knowledge, becomes vital.
The factor determining the effectiveness of communication of new knowledge is the
organisation of human capital. Skills, in our case technological skills in particular, need to be
organised in such a way as to promote effective communication of  knowledge. To realise
exchange of knowledge about new technologies at a national level, i.e. between many
organisations and at different levels, e.g. between upstream and downstream firms, between
universities and industries, or between research institutes (public or private) and industries,
between the system of production and the financial system, and between the public and the
private sector, technological skills must be allocated across the various types of organisations
involved in technological progress. In this manner, researchers in, for example, universities can
convey knowledge to researchers in firms who then can ‘translate’ and adapt this knowledge to
the firm’s specific context. 
In summary, if the base of human capital is too low, or  the organisation of human capital
not effective in promoting communication, a lagging country is not likely to close the technology
gap and will fall behind.
5.2 Catching-Up Potential in the Baltics: what are the possibilities for future ‘Bal-techs’?
It is often argued that the comparative advantage of former socialist countries and the
Baltic countries in particular is established by their well educated populations (Sorsa (1994)).
Given these well developed stocks of human capital, an indication of which is given by data on
enrollment rates in secundary and tertiary education,  these countries should export more20
technologically intensive products in the longer run. However, viewed in the light of the previous
analysis, having a well developed stock of human capital may not be sufficient to catch up with
the technological frontier, and increase competitiveness in technology intensive sectors. Human
capital, and scientists, engineers and technicians, in particular, must be organised in such a way
as to promote diffusion of knowledge.
We use UNESCO data to illustrate the organisation of R&D personnel, i.e. personnel
engaged in research and experimental development. R&D personnel consists of scientists and
engineers, technicians and auxiliary personnel. It can be employed in research performed in the
productive sector, be it integrated or non-integrated R&D, research performed in institutes of
higher education, or research performed in the general service sector. The productive sector
contains: 
“(a) both domestic and foreign-owned industrial and trading establishments located in the
country, which produce and distribute goods and services for sale, and organisations directly
serving them, whatever their form of ownership, private, non-profit, or government. (...) 
(b) Also included are governmental or non-governmental organisations and private non-profit
institutions mainly or exclusively serving industrial or trading establishments, except those
institutes, experimental stations, etc., operating under the direct control of or being associated
with institutions of higher education. In socialist countries, R&D institutes of branch ministries
are to be classified in this sector.” [UNESCO (1974), p. 544-545] With respect to the distinction
between integrated and non-integrated R&D, UNESCO remarks the following: “Due to the
different structure of the productive sector in countries with different socio-economic systems
and in order to facilitate comparisons, the R&D effort should be measured on the following two
‘levels’:
(a) Integrated R&D. This includes all R&D activities integrated or directly associated with
other economic activities of industrial and trading establishments (...).
(b) Non-integrated R&D. This includes all R&D activities not integrated in or directly
associated with other economic activities, executed by such governmental or non-governmental
organisations or institutes as defined in (b) above which are serving a specific two- or three digit
group (ISIC) of the economy, (...) in the case of East European countries, (...) the Technical and
Economic Progress Fund.” [UNESCO (1974), ibid.] The general service sector contains all
activities not belonging to the productive sector or higher education. Included among other things
are laboratories of national research councils and Academies of Science. The organisation of
R&D personnel in the Baltics in comparison with countries that belong to the technological
frontier is shown in Table 8.
There is a striking difference between technological leaders such as the United States,
Japan, and Germany, and the Baltic countries. In the former, R&D personnel is mainly employed
in the productive sector. These countries are also the ones with the highest level of technology
in production, or rapid technological progress in production. In the latter very little R&D
personnel is integrated in production. It is concentrated in higher education and the general
service sector. Research in the general service sector is dominated by the Academies of Science.
There, the emphasis is mainly on theoretical, fundamental research rather than on applied
research. This structure reflects the low priority given to technological progress in production in
socialist economies in general (Lankhuizen (forthcoming)). The small percentage of R&D
personnel in the productive sector implies that few scientific innovations are implemented in
production and explains why the level of production technology in these countries is so low. We
conclude that the organisation of human capital in the Baltics does not particularly suit easy
communication of new knowledge to organisations involved in production. This organisation is
more suitable for scientific purposes, in which it has reportedly been succesful (World Bank
(1992)).
How likely is this organisation to be changed? The organisation of human capital in
processes of generating and diffusing new knowledge is determined within the context of its
national system of innovation. The process of innovation takes place within the wider context
of a country’s structure of production. Thus, the organisation of human capital, in its turn, is
determined within the context of the production structure. Production, and as a part thereof,
innovation are determined by countries’ culture, ideology and government policies (Johnson
(1992)). According to Johnson, “modern production is an organised process, which relies heavily
upon behavioural regularities.” [Johnson (1992), p. 39] He refers to such behavioural regularities
as institutions. Let us follow Johnson and Gregersen (1995) in distinguishing between formal and
informal institutions. Informal institutions can take many forms like e.g., norms of co-operation,
organisational conventions and practices. They are highly qualitative but nonetheless crucial
elements in national systems of innovation, because without them communication would not be
possible. Codes of communication are embedded in a larger framework of habits, norms,
routines, established practices and rules, that have been shaped by a country's history, culture,
and education. Formal institutions reflect culture as well as government policies, and ideologies.
Institutions are formal in the sense that they have been written down. They set standards for the
development and quality of new technology, its diffusion, as well as the co-operation in
networks. Examples include patent laws, laws and regulation about technical service, joint
venture regulations, diffusion oriented public policies. 
In fact, all organisations and their behaviour are influenced by these institutions, giving
them a common denominator. The production structure and the national system of innovation
will also reflect a country's institutional set-up. There is a strong case of path dependence in
institutional change. The rate and direction of institutional change are highly dependent upon the
historical structure of the institutional set-up. These have developed through centuries and
therefore change is likely to be slow. As the institutional set-up is highly country-specific,
institutional change exhibits strong country-specific path dependence. It might be here that we
find the most fundamental restriction to international learning and the international transfer of
technology. Catching up by the Baltics as seen in this light might take longer than assumed in
studies that only look at the amount of human capital in these countries.
6 Conclusion
We can conclude that the Baltics are heavily influenced by their socialist past. A past in
which  producers were isolated from consumer preferences and price signals, in which efficiency
and quality were of little consequence, and in which innovation play a negligible role. Their
production structure and export structure today reflects all this. Change is going to be slow and
costly. It is going to require the transformation of the entire economy. The issue of  international
competitiveness, which we dealt with in this part, cannot be regarded separately from structural
reform in the domestic economies, as competitiveness in international markets ultimately derives
from country-specific advantages. Exploitation or creation of advantages cannot be achieved
without privatisation and investments in start-up activity, a sound financial system, and other
market institutions. Structural reform must create the basis for export performance, which can
then sustain, or generate, additional growth.
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Appendix
Table 1
Interrepublic Trade, 1990 (million rubles)
A. Estonia
Domestic prices World prices
export import export import
Industry: 2689.9 2942.7 1745.8 2946.2
power 112.2 12.6 168.3 18.9
oil & gas 0 228.7 0 516
coal 0 2.9 0 2.7
other fuels 13.3 0.2 9 0.1
ferrous 6 139.7 7.2 163.2
metallurgy
chemicals 295.7 459.9 244.6 387.7
machinery 541.9 1015.4 559 1257.5
wood & paper 127.5 74 77.8 50.5
construction 29.2 46 27 41.6
materials
light industry 8545.2 480.6 302.7 172.1
food products 632.1 291.2 294.6 107.4
other industrial 70.3 94.1 43.1 65.7
Table 1 (continued)
Interrepublic Trade, 1990 (million rubles)
B. Latvia
Domestic prices World prices
export import export import
Industry: 4626.9 4445.9  3549.6 4643.6
power 87.5 111.1 131.3 166.7
oil & gas 5.6 447.4 12.5 1006.1
coal 0 10.1 0 9.4
other fuels 0 0.2 0 0.1
ferrous 94.9 346.9 114.8 414.7
metallurgy
chemicals 646.3 596.2 533.7 477.9
machinery 1376.4 1587.7 1565.7 1794.8
wood & paper 115 135.8 77.9 100.4
construction 68.6 65.4 49.7 68
materials
light industry 888.2 617.3 314.2 184.2
food products 1082 230.6 588.6 80.4
other industrial 249.3 158.6 139.3 109.3
Table 1 (continued)
Interrepublic Trade, 1990 (million rubles)
C. Lithuania
Domestic prices World prices
export import export import
Industry: 5048.5 5615.9 3972.1 7687.4
power 199.8 98.8 299.7 148.2
oil & gas 232.6 879.1 518 2359.4
coal 0 14.1 0 31.2
other fuels 0 0 0 0
ferrous 21.2 306.1 19.4 357.3
metallurgy
chemicals 370.2 735.4 297.7 610.6
machinery 1832.4 2069.2 1833.4 2417.2
wood & paper 157.1 183 119.9 135.1
construction 65.8 112.3 63.1 104.8
materials
light industry 1394.3 664 431.9 188.8
food products 720.3 270.3 341.3 103.2
other industrial 48 125.6 36.3 86.4
Source: Watson (1994)
Table 2
Extrarepublic Trade, 1990 (million rubles)
A. Estonia
Domestic prices World prices
export import export import
Industry: 190.9 657.1 114.8 315.4
power 0 20.3 0 30.4
oil & gas 0 0 0 0
coal 0 3.5 0 5
other fuels 0.4 0 0.3 0
ferrous 10.2 7.8 15.2 10.5
metallurgy
chemicals 7.3 52.6 5.9 38.1
machinery 23.4 131.1 26.4 107.5
wood & paper 16.6 5.7 9.5 3.9
construction 1.2 4.9 1 1.6
materials
light industry 42.8 278.4 16.6 69.1
food products 84.4 134 36.1 42.4
other industrial 4.6 15.9 3.8 4.8
Table 2 (continued)
Extrarepublic Trade, 1990 (million rubles)
B. Latvia
Domestic prices World prices
export import export import
Industry: 223.8 1431.8 165 873.2
power 0 0 0 0
oil & gas 0 1.4 0 1.6
coal 0 22.9 0 32.9
other fuels 0 0 0 0
ferrous 5 8.2 5.2 10.6
metallurgy
chemicals 6.8 136.5 6.2 106.6
machinery 98 391.8 94.2 311.4
wood & paper 21.5 19.1 13.1 12.3
construction 4.1 6.1 3.5 2.3
materials
light industry 26.9 416 11.4 107.6
food products 58 395.8 28.5 277
other industrial 3.5 32.7 2.9 9.9
Table 2 (continued)
Extrarepublic Trade, 1990 (million rubles)
C. Lithuania
Domestic prices World prices
export import export import
Industry: 407.7 1498.4 395.3 851
power 0 0 0 0
oil & gas 72.7 0.9 161.3 1
coal 0 0 0 0
other fuels 3.2 0 2.2 0
ferrous 1.3 13.6 1.7 17.7
metallurgy
chemicals 15.8 145.2 12.4 110.1
machinery 174.5 498.6 147 400.6
wood & paper 32.7 12.7 19.8 7.9
construction 5.5 14.1 4.7 8.3
materials
light industry 31.6 492.3 13.7 121.9
food products 67.2 283.9 29.5 171.6
other industrial 3 35.6 2.5 10.8
Source: Watson (1994)
Table 3
Exports
 
($ million) to EU, Estonia
1992 1993 1994 1995
products of chemical
& allied industries
6.56 8.95 15.08 26.67
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber
0.80 1.71 1.69 17.15
raw hides, leather,
furskin & articles
3.17 2.83 4.20 11.58
wood & articles of
wood
1.75 13.08 40.35 151.9
pulp of wood; paper
& paperboard
0.59 0.35 0.81 7.10
textiles & textile art. 5.68 22.55 31.85 149.4
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas, ...
0.64 2.35 5.52 17.04
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, ...
1.87 2.17 1.92 8.18
precious & semi-
precious stones, ...
0.48 4.0 0.92 3.65
base, metals &
articles of base metal
4.62 21.92 26.5 78.47
mechanical &
electrical machinery
1.74 4.64 5.36 147.5
transport vehicles 3.31 2.42 2.08 26.19
optical instruments &
apparatus, ...
0.11 1.06 0.73 7.84
arms & ammunition 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.01
miscellaneous
manufact. articles
5.86 7.81 15.98 62.13
Table 3 (continued)
Imports
 
($ million) from EU, Estonia
1992 1993 1994 1995
products of chemical
& allied industries
4.47 15.02 32.79 102.7
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber
1.62 6.74 14.62 75.15
raw hides, leather,
furskin & articles
0.33 1.02 2.40 11.93
wood & articles of
wood
0.06 0.64 0.99 15.67
pulp of wood; paper
& paperboard
0.86 3.27 5.02 56.69
textiles & textile art. 5.91 17.67 31.55 151.6
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas, ...
0.51 2.14 7.53 23.09
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, ...
0.64 1.78 5.10 32.28
precious & semi-
precious stones, ...
0.14 0.17 0.27 4.07
base, metals &
articles of base metal
1.50 5.64 12.41 97.08
mechanical &
electrical machinery
18.11 38.74 75.82 376.0
transport vehicles 12.40 34.72 38.69 92.75
optical instruments &
apparatus, ...
1.28 7.63 13.65 36.08
arms & ammunition 0.05 0.51 0.49 0.49
miscellaneous
manufact. articles
1.44 4.02 7.78 54.35
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Estonia
 1995 January-September21
Table 4
Exports ($ million) to EU, Lithuania
1994 19952
1
products of chemical
& allied industries
96.25 94.23
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber
10.85 24.09
raw hides, leather,
furskin & articles
14.85 15.68
wood & articles of
wood
41.53 79.68
pulp of wood; paper
& paperboard
3.98 2.88
textiles & textile art. 98.92 152.8
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas, ...
5.07 5.42
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, ...
2.18 4.44
precious & semi-
precious stones, ...
7.57 0.94
base, metals &
articles of base metal
51.12 89.06
mechanical &
electrical machinery
23.60 48.02
transport vehicles 15.40 9.89
optical instruments &
apparatus, ...
1.95 2.0
arms & ammunition 0.02 0.04
miscellaneous
manufact. articles
14.27 14.55
 1995 January-September22
Table 4 (continued)
Imports ($ million) from EU, Lithuania
1994 19952
2
products of chemical
& allied industries
52.28 62.16
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber
31.02 49.27
raw hides, leather,
furskin & articles
3.88 5.36
wood & articles of
wood
3.95 8.18
pulp of wood; paper
& paperboard
16.61 28.14
textiles & textile art. 82.88 113.8
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas, ...
5.88 3.80
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, ...
7.19 12.62
precious & semi-
precious stones, ...
0.55 1.33
base, metals &
articles of base metal
25.85 43.03
mechanical &
electrical machinery
191.5 183.5
transport vehicles 60.40 82.09
optical instruments &
apparatus, ...
19.58 27.63
arms & ammunition 0.60 0.46
miscellaneous
manufact. articles
15.58 18.38
Source: Lithuania’s Statistical Yearbook
Table 5
Total exports ($ million), Latvia
1993 1994 1995 1996.
I
products of chemical
& allied industries 69.93 72.71 83.41 21.74
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber 6.07 8.85 13.49 2.51
raw hides, leather,
furskin & articles 15.49 17.88 21.57 5.75
wood & articles of
wood 88.94 201.8 344.6 71.28
pulp of wood; paper
& paperboard 8.03 8.41 15.19 6.18
textiles & textile art. 127.5 130.9 182.6 54.9
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas, ... 22.43 17.3 8.97 2.72
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, ... 13.78 12.97 26 6.76
precious & semi-
precious stones, ... 7.65 2.11 2.41 0.33
base, metals &
articles of base metal 85.85 100.2 103.3 17.46
mechanical &
electrical machinery 72.44 91.66 113.7 29.5
transport vehicles 125.3 98.4 83.19 17.18
optical instruments &
apparatus, ... 6.19 6.05 5.79 1.06
arms & ammunition 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.02
miscellaneous
manufact. articles 34.77 44.6 57.81 13.15
Table 5 (continued)
Total imports ($ million), Latvia
1993 1994 1995 1996.
I
products of chemical
& allied industries 69.14 126.3 198.2 56.72
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber 17.24 36.03 65.96 16.71
raw hides, leather,
furskin & articles 3.63 4.59 6.16 1.77
wood & articles of
wood 2.79 6 14.14 2.68
pulp of wood; paper
& paperboard 13.29 36.94 77.28 22.55
textiles & textile art. 44.55 73.37 139.5 36.95
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas, ... 10.55 10.71 12.72 2.81
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, ... 10.42 17.41 30.08 7.02
precious & semi-
precious stones, ... 0.94 0.95 2.03 0.37
base, metals &
articles of base metal 42.7 62.05 112.6 25.76
mechanical &
electrical machinery 95.98 200.8 305.5 77.7
transport vehicles 88.06 83.42 142.8 32.17
optical instruments &
apparatus, ... 10.11 30.14 35.47 10.84
arms & ammunition 0.95 1.63 2.04 0.19
miscellaneous
manufact. articles 12.51 22.16 41.21 10.05
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia
 UNIDO-data covering only footwear have been used.23
Table 6
A.
Dollar Wages per Employee
 
in Latvia
1990 1991 1992
products of chemical & allied
industries
28 43 511
plastics & articles thereof; rubber 26 42 321
raw hides, leather, furskin &
articles
28 53 429
wood & articles of wood 26 49 351
pulp of wood; paper &
paperboard
23 50 338
textiles & textile art. 23 50 359
footwear, headgear, umbrellas,
...
23
30 39 429
articles of stone, plaster, cement,
...
27 53 357
base, metals & articles of base
metal
27 50 397
mechanical & electrical
machinery
26 48 314
transport vehicles 28 54 442
optical instruments & apparatus,
...
26 44 260
Source: own calculations based on UNIDO data.
Note: in order to derive dollar amounts we have used the 1992 exchange rate of 0.72 lats/$. This is calculated by
converting the 1992 Latvian ruble-to-dollar exchange rate into lats, using a conversion rate of 200:1 Latvian Ruble-
to-lats (IMF (1994c)).
 UNIDO-data covering only footwear have been used.24
Table 6 (continued)
B.
Labour Productivity (output per employee),
 
in dollars, in Latvia
1990 1991 1992
products of chemical & allied
industries
408 910 7029
plastics & articles thereof; rubber 175 437 1992
raw hides, leather, furskin &
articles
226 999 3528
wood & articles of wood 106 265 2567
pulp of wood; paper &
paperboard
214 602 4179
textiles & textile art. 220 603 2802
footwear, headgear, umbrellas,
...
24
140 791 3026
articles of stone, plaster, cement,
...
111 299 2551
base, metals & articles of base
metal
154 309 3909
mechanical & electrical
machinery
140 279 1750
transport vehicles 129 330 3797
optical instruments & apparatus,
...
97 139 766
Source: own calculations based on UNIDO data.
Note: in order to derive dollar amounts we have used the 1992 exchange rate of 0.72 lats/$. This is calculated by
converting the 1992 Latvian ruble-to-dollar exchange rate into lats, using a conversion rate of 200:1 Latvian Ruble-
to-lats (IMF (1994c)).
Table 7
Unit Value Ratios, Latvia
Harmonised
commodity unit value ratio
description (export/import)
1993 1994 1995 1996.I
products of chemical &
allied ind 21.4 2.48 1.92 1.66
plastics & articles
thereof; rubber 1.44 1 0.88 1.07
raw hides, leather,
furskin & artcls 1.44 1.82 1.57 1.64
wood & articles of
wood 0.41 0.23 0.27 0.28
pulp of wood; paper &
paperboard 0.97 0.64 0.44 0.64
textiles & textile
articles 1.1 0.84 0.85 1.05
footwear, headgear,
umbrellas ... 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.35
articles of stone,
plaster, cement, .. 0.88 1.17 1.67 1.45
precious &
semiprecious stones, ... 0.32 0.99 0.33 0.88
base metals & articles
of base metal 1.62 0.75 0.41 0.42
mechanical & electrical
machinery 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.38
transport vehicles 0.87 0.6 0.79 0.68
optical instruments &
apparatus, ... 0.56 0.6 0.27 0.6
arms & ammunition 0.18 0.3 1.48 0.89
miscellaneous manuf.
articles 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.63
Source: own calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.
 The numbers in brackets are the registration years.25
Table 8
The Organisation of R&D Personnel in Percentages
Country Category of Productive Higher General25
personnel sector education service
Integrated Non-
R&D integrated
R&D
United States scientists and
(1993) engineers 79 13 06
technicians
auxiliary
personnel
Japan (1992) scientists and
engineers 61 32 07
technicians 79 11 10
auxiliary
personnel 51 28 21
Germany scientists and
(1991) engineers 59 26 16
technicians 67 14 19
auxiliary
personnel 64 16 19
Estonia scientists and
(1994) engineers 60 40
technicians 24 76
auxiliary
personnel 61 39
Latvia (1994) scientists and
engineers 13 43 45
technicians 08 51 41
auxiliary
personnel 30 20 51
Source: UNESCO (1996).
